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WHAT IS AT STAKE1
abstract
Recent events involving two symbols of ancient and modern philosophy, and two capitals of the Idea 
of Europe – Athens and Paris – suggest the timeliness of this issue of “Phenomenology and Mind” on 
Philosophy and the future of Europe. In the spirit of the Manifesto di Ventotene philosophy should be 
conceived of as the very foundation of the European Utopia, and the Charter of Rights of the European 
Union as the legally binding incarnation of Ancient and Modern Practical Reason. Dignity and Justice are 
in fact the alpha and omega of this Charter: two values being respectively the source of what is due to the 
individual person and what is necessary for the good order of society. The core of the Charter hosts the three 
central values of Modernity and its battles, liberté, égalité, fraternité (Solidarity), plus a fourth one, not 
yet explicitly referred to in the preceding Declarations and Constitutions: Citizenship, the value hosting all 
the virtues of Public Ethics, without which no Republic could survive for long under the rule of law.
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1 The present issue inaugurates a new series of Phenomenology and Mind, the journal of San Raffaele Faculty of 
Philosophy and its Research Centres. While the editorial and scientific boards stay the same, our journal will 
published, from now on, by Firenze University Press. I wish to thank the new Publisher and staff on behalf of us all, 
wishing us a happy joint venture for the next years.
ROBERTA DE MONTICELLI 




WHAT IS AT STAKE
This issue of our journal is exceptionally multilingual in order to emphasize the value of 
that particular variety of national traditions which the European Union is supposed to 
have maintained and harmonized. We underwent the last phase of editorial processing in 
the middle of the most symbolic crisis that the EU has experienced since its inception: the 
concrete risk of the so-called “Grexit” – the Greek referendary “no” to austerity conditions 
imposed upon the extension of their European loan. We have witnessed the eleventh hour 
negotiations that prevented the country where the very idea of Europe first took root, from 
quitting the Eurozone if not the European Union itself. We are now witnessing the global 
choc of a terror attack on the heart of Europe and against the city which is the very symbol of 
European Enlightenment: Paris. Hence this issue of the journal could not be more timely, even 
in its title: Philosophy – and the Future of Europe.
Why philosophy? Most of the received essays focus on the distance between the ideals which 
inspired the construction of the EU and the actual way in which that institution works in its 
present state. Some even call these ideals rhetorical. Others suggest new ways of interpreting them: 
some would reduce their axiological ambition. Others, on the contrary, denounce the present 
“governance” of the EU for betraying the democratic ideal of the Manifesto di Ventotene, down 
to the very name “governance”, denoting and at the same time disguising a non constitutional 
government, an executive power without legislative or judiciary checks and balances. 
Be that as it may (and however far the working of an institution may stray from its 
constitutive raison d’être) one should not ignore this fact: the European Union is an institution 
founded on universally valid values. As such, it is the finest and ripest flower of philosophy. Of 
modern philosophy, by all means – for it is a late child of what some call a misleading utopia, 
a Kantian effort for perpetual peace among States. It is a late child of philosophy tout court 
however, and hence quite particularly of ancient Greek philosophy as well, as far as we know 
it. If we agree at least with the spirit (if not the letter) of the following remark by Simone 
Weil, written in 1941, as she hoped that a new European civilization would emerge after the 
bankruptcy of Practical Reason in the XXth century.
La notion de valeur est au coeur de la philosophie. Toute réflexion portant sur la notion 
de valeur, sur une hiérarchie de valeurs, est philosophique, tout effort de la pensée 
ayant d’autre objet que la valeur est, si on l’examine de près, étranger à la philosophie 
(Weil 1941, pp. 121-126).
14
RObeRta De MOntIcellI
There is a core tenet which seems to be at stake in any valuating experience. For in any 
experience of assessment – the suffering of wrongs or enjoyment of flourishing – we take our 
lives seriously. Yet what does it mean, taking one’s life seriously, thereby attributing importance 
or value to it? What is a life worth being lived? Is it just life as such, at its biological level? Is life 
as such worth the pains and troubles it costs, under any condition, including slavery or severe 
illness? Hardly so: we recognize the value of our lives each time we regret spending them in 
nonsense, or regret lost opportunities to let our talents flourish. We feel the responsibility we 
have for them – of making something valuable and meaningful out of them. Even when craving 
for the sweet light of this earth, just that, we praise the splendor of the light and the tranquillity 
of simple pleasures – as Ulysses prepared himself for his next life in the other world, rejecting 
the lives of kings and heroes, happy to choose even that of a farm laborer. Between Plato’s Myth 
of Er and the Parable of Talents, the simplest and most universal questions of philosophy take 
root. As far as we know, they are rooted in «Europe» or in its cultural tradition – and yet these 
questions remain as universal and universally accessible as does philosophy itself.
Taking one’s life seriously is an attitude – subject to overzealousness, for sure – which first 
found a universally accessible formulation in Plato’s thought that the individual soul is the 
“living centre” of the universe. Pico della Mirandola’s celebrated Oratio de hominis dignitate 
(1486) refers back to Plato – while discovering, on the track of Augustin, the fateful freedom 
of this “living center”, between being and not-being. The concept – and the Latin name – of 
this value of ourselves which is at stake in any value experience, has been with us long before 
the Enlightenment and the Age of Rights. Dignity is its name. The Enlightenment “only” 
adds the discovery of the essential relation Dignity bears to Justice. As Kant famously wrote, 
“Should justice completely disappear, no human life on earth would be worth living” (Kant 
1983, p. 165). The reason is that “true” dignity only inheres to the exercise of the liberty of the 
moral subject, autonomy. No life deprived of moral autonomy is worth being lived. But injustice 
prevents many from exercising moral autonomy, and makes them subjects of arbitrary 
powers, within and outside of themselves.
The recognized link of Dignity and Justice adds Equality to Dignity, making Equal Dignity the 
very foundation of the Age of Rights. This quality which ought to be acknowledged in human 
persons independently of their virtues, status or citizenship; which should command for them 
equal respect and consideration, has not ceased to release its normative power since 1789. The 
concept itself was given exact wording in the First Principle of the Universal Declaration of the 
Human Rights in 1948, to prevent discrimination forever after the Nazi crimes. (“All humans 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights”). Addressing the insertion of Human Rights in post-
war European constitutions and the injection of public ethics at the very foundation of politics 
via the constitutive principle of the EU, Jürgen Habermas quite recently wrote:
But these same normative claims derive their foundation from a universalistic ethics, 
whose contents, thanks to the idea of human dignity, have been included in civil and 
human rights of democratic Constitutions for a long time now. Only in virtue of this 
inner connection between human dignity and human rights, that explosive conjunction 
of morality and law has been set up, which should promote the construction of more 
justice in political institutions (Habermas, 2011). 1
This survey should provide some evidence for our claim concerning philosophy as the very 
foundation of the European Utopia, or the constitutive principles of the European Union as 
1  It. transl. (2013), p. 31, our translation, author’s italics.
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the legally binding incarnation of Ancient and Modern Practical Reason. Back to the Manifesto 
di Ventotene, we may now perceive both the Platonic and the Kantian note in its opening 
paragraph:
Modern civilization set down as its own foundation the principle of liberty, according 
to which a human being ought not to be a mere instrument of others, but an autonomous 
life center. This code at hand, an imposing historical action is being taken against all 
aspects of social life, which would not respect it.
Consequently it is no coincidence that human dignity is the first one of the six values under 
which the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is articulated.2
Dignity and Justice are in fact the alpha and omega of this Charter: two values being 
respectively the source of what is due to the individual person and what is necessary for the 
good order of society. They hold together, like the two slices of bread of a moral sandwich, 
the three central values of Modernity and its battles, liberté, égalité, fraternité (Solidarity), plus 
a fourth one, not yet explicitly referred to in the preceding Declarations and Constitutions: 
Citizenship, the value hosting all the virtues of Public Ethics, without which no Republic could 
survive for long under the rule of law. Perhaps the very sequence of those six values is but a 
commentary on the celebrated proposition of Kant quoted above, concerning the intrinsic 
connection between Justice and the value of our lives. As if this Charter spanned, between its 
alpha and its omega, all the generations of human rights which emerged in the course of the 
civil, political, social and cultural history of Modernity. As if across its conflicts, its tragedies, 
and all the defeats of those who were “hungry and thirsty of justice”, we had learned more and 
more about what we owe to each other, and what a good political order ought to grant, even 
against those threats which are not borne of individual bad will, but emerge instead from the 
workings of associated life, economy and the distribution of power. 
In fact, one can never exhaust reflecting upon Kant’s claim, for it reveals a dimension of what 
is due to each human being, exceeding not only life itself and its bare necessities as usually 
understood, but also the sphere of negative and positive liberties, i.e. of civil and political 
rights. There are, so to speak, “needs of the soul”, and these have everything to do with justice. 
We need to feel that our lives, and those of our children even more, are worth the effort, the 
pains and the risks that they cost: in short, we need our lives to make sense. Injustice is the 
main evil of associated life, and it certainly can operate as a bulldozer uprooting homes and 
affects, or depriving lives of every tangible support. But injustice can affect people even in 
more intangible ways, depriving people of will and meaning by vanquishing in their lives 
every chance to flourish.
How does it feel, to live a life not worth living?
Just look around. It is a depressed state of mind, a state of hopelessness that we may describe as 
a form of atrophy that deadens the essential core of one’s mental life. Let me borrow a page of 
XXth century psychology to spell out which part of mental life I’m thinking of: “Let us for the 
moment give the name value to this common trait of intrinsic requiredness or wrongness, and 
let us call insight all awareness of such intellectual, moral or aesthetic value. We can then say 
2  Proclaimed in 2000 at the Nice European Council, the Charter has become legally binding on the EU with the entry 




that value and corresponding insight constitute the very essence of human mental life […]”.
What happens when impairment of sensibility to values – or even sheer indifference, as an 
outcome of depression and resignation to injustice (“Nothing but normality”) – becomes a 
dominant state of mind? The same psychologist has a severe diagnosis to offer:
Thus negativism spreads through the population like an epidemic. […] Gradually 
Nothing But becomes the unformulated creed of your postman, your politician, and 
your prime minister. When this phase is reached – and we have reached it – few people 
will have any stable convictions beyond their personal interests, which seem to survive 
even when, as values, they should also succumb (Köhler 1938, pp. 36-37).
How a propos for philosophy and for the future of Europe. Doesn’t this description fit the 
apparent state of mind of large parts of the European population? In some countries, among 
which Italy, negativity seems to stem from the erosion of the most important goods of 
associated life, such as trust in the institutions, esteem and respect for officials, legal certainty, 
perception of some connection between competencies and public functions, capacities and 
promotions, crimes and penalties. These traits of trust central to associated life are often 
called “social capital”: yet, more simply, they represent the very conditions under which the 
value of everybody’s life can be acknowledged in its very most important aspects which our 
Constitution calls “social dignity”.
When this acknowledgment is missing or impaired because the bonds of trust are broken, 
worn out by abuse through unlawfulness, corruption and lie, the “public faith” – so-called 
by our greatest modern poet, Giacomo Leopardi – drops to zero, and so does participation to 
civil and political life, as well as material and moral cooperation. When we reach such a stage, 
States are ready to default, civilizations to collapse. As long as we suffer from such a public 
misery, we respond as active citizens, trying to keep democracy alive as much as possible. 
But as soon as we stop suffering, that is stop feeling the disvalue of losing public trust, we have 
already dismissed the moral subject in ourselves. The sentry has fallen asleep; democracy is 
ready to become something else. Are we not close to that point? 
As a conclusion, I shall quote Altiero Spinelli once again – for the last time. Greece is a mirror 
for other Mediterranean countries, and especially for Italy. Spinelli, who was both a realist and 
a visionary thinker, made a striking prophecy. True democracies within the single States, quite 
particularly the European ones, in this globalized world, are probably no longer possible. Here 
is why:
Struggling for democracy today is realizing, first of all, that we must stop this 
meaningless, not only Italian, but European rush toward a society which is polarized 
into organized interests, clamouring at the State and paralyzing it when they are 
in balance, and entrenching its executive, unbalanced power more and more, when 
a group or a coalition has managed to overwhelm its opponent and take the power 
(Spinelli 1946, pp. 105-106).
The present issue of our journal addresses a burning question, to what I called the finest 
and ripest flower of European philosophy, the European Union. The question is: why is this 
institution running the danger of forgetting its reasons d’être, or worse: why is it becoming 
insensible to its constitutive values. May this common effort of thought and knowledge be the 
beginning of a Socratic awakening for us all. 
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